

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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A Tudeh Party comparison of the events of 21 July 1952¹ and 19 August 1953² follows:

- a. On 21 July 1952 the petty bourgeoisie (dealers and merchants from the bazaar) supported Prime Minister Mossadeq. The Tudeh Party seized this opportunity to take the initiative. As a result, the Party did not suffer even one casualty; instead, all the casualties were in the ranks of the bourgeoisie.
- b. On 19 August 1953, the bourgeoisie failed to support Mossadeq despite the appeal of the Party through tracts and declarations.
- c. Mossadeq was never supported by the Army. On the contrary, the Army fought him on 19 August. Mossadeq blundered by relying upon the Army for support. During his premiership, Mossadeq failed to overcome Royalist fanaticism and therefore did not win the Army to his side.

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- d. Mossadeq was an instrument of imperialism, not of public opinion.

The Iranian nation, of course, made use of this development, and because Mossadeq did not obey the imperialists but instead submitted to the people, the imperialists overthrew him.

- e. The peasants are not yet fully awake. If the nation is to achieve final victory this important problem must be solved because the peasants must play an effective role in the revolution. The Party has worked to this end, but has not yet been successful.
- f. The peasants did not support Mossadeq, because of another mistake on his part. He decreed only an ownership interest for the peasants, which was insufficient. Even the Shah, by dividing his land, was more generous.

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- g. All during his premiership, Mossadeq decreed laws against the Tudeh Party. He prevented the progress of movement by fighting with democratic groups and repressing their heroes.
- h. Although the bourgeoisie desires the Party to revolt, it wants to be a spectator to the revolution. The Party alone cannot achieve victory. Lenin once said that the working class never went to the field alone.
- i. The Party erred in saying that it could prevent any coup d'etat. The fact that it was unable to oppose the recent coup is sufficient proof. This error gave a feeling of false security to the people who unfortunately relaxed their vigilance. Only with the cooperation of the people can the Party oppose coups.
- j. Members are to read the book Fascism by Dimitriov⁴ and those parts of the two-volume History of Civilization (sic) dealing with the 1915 and 1917 revolutions which failed.
- k. At present, the Iranian people are not prepared for a revolution, because the anti-colonial movement is not yet mature.

25X1 ☐ Comments

- 1. The date of the demonstrations resulting in the ouster of former Prime Minister Qavam and the return to power of former Prime Minister Mossadeq.
- 2. The date of the rise to power of Prime Minister Zahedi.

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- 3. Former Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated on 7 March 1951.
- 4. Possibly Georgi Dimitrov, author of Working Class against Fascism and United Fronts against Fascism.

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